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The method of first differences as an approach to modeling change is described 
and it is compared to more conventional two-wave panel models. Substantial 
advantages are found to the first-difference approach, especially if there are 
unmeasured, unchanging predictor variables in the model. It is also argued that 
there are substantial problems in the interpretation of results from the conventional 
two-wave models. Some of the analytic results are illustrated with a number of 
applications to the area of stressful life events. 0 1985 Academic Press. Inc. 
Recent theoretical advances emphasize the dynamic, everchanging as- 
pects of humans and their social environments (Elder, 1979; Brim and 
Kagan, 1980). Static conceptions are criticized for failing to view aging 
as a developmental process. The complex interaction of changing humans 
in changing environments is not thought to be captured adequately by 
simple relationships among variables at a point in time. Hence, many 
advocate longitudinal analysis of panel data collected at multiple time 
points as a way to capture these complex, often reciprocal influences 
over time. 
Panel data on individuals, families, and their life conditions are becoming 
increasingly available and open new possibilities for analysis. But they 
also present new challenges and problems. The greatest potential con- 
tribution of longitudinal data is that they permit empirical analyses of 
dynamic aspects of behavior. Such analyses can range from the simple 
description of change or allowance for some lagged response to the 
estimation of truly dynamic structural models that explain short-run or 
life cycle behavior of individuals. Unfortunately we are still far from 
reaching this ultimate goal of obtaining reliable parameter estimates of 
truly dynamic models for a number of reasons. 
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A first prerequisite is that social science theory must advance to the 
point where we can specify all of the necessary components of dynamic, 
reciprocal processes (Bohrnstedt, 1975). For example, general statements 
of the complexity and interplay of human-environment interactions that 
are prevalent in discussions of human behavior fall short of specifying 
all relevant variables, the functional form, and the timing and duration 
of influences. Second, complex dynamic models make great demands on 
measurement quality and frequency. In the absence of very specific 
theories on the form and process of influences, time series with short 
intervals over long time spans are needed to determine empirically time 
lags and complex patterns of causation. Moreover, the “signal” must 
far exceed the “noise.” For many applications, social scientists are 
fortunate to have two waves of data of somewhat dubious measurement 
quality, making it difficult to refine their models. 
Given these theoretical and data limitations, major advances from the 
use of longitudinal data for the estimation of truly dynamic models are 
apt to be slow in coming. Given this, it is important not to overlook the 
more modest benefits of longitudinal data for the estimation of what are 
essentially static models. After all, a tremendous amount of professional 
time and effort have been devoted to the formulation and estimation of 
static models. In some cases, panel data from several points in time can 
be used to obtain better parameter estimates of these models through 
the method of first differences. The basic properties of such models are 
well known (e.g., Wonnacott and Wonnacott, 1970), but their implications 
have not been well developed for the kinds of social science models that 
have been estimated with cross-sectional or short-term panel data. In 
the case of some models, dynamic structure can be captured in a cross- 
sectional formulation and the method of first differences is likely to 
produce better estimates of the dynamic parameters. 
In this paper, we detail the method of first differences focusing on its 
strengths and limitations compared to cross-sectional analysis and con- 
ventional two-wave models. The strengths include differencing out un- 
measured and unchanging causes of the outcome measure that may be 
associated with measured independent variables, eliminating measurement 
error biases under certain conditions, and adequately representing dynamic 
processes under certain rather restrictive conditions. 
Taking first differences, that is, the difference between equations rep- 
resenting processes at two points in time, results in a differenced equation 
which includes change scores. Several researchers argue that the use of 
change scores for modeling purposes is problematic (Bohmstedt, 1969, 
1975; Cronbach and Furby, 1970). Their reasons include inadequacy of 
change scores for representing continuous processes, the unreliability of 
measurement, and the presumed biases that result if the correlation between 
the initial level of a dependent variable and its change is not explicitly 
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modeled. We argue that the first of these arguments is probably correct 
for many social phenomena, but its full implications cannot be understood 
except in the context of a specified theoretical model. By contrast, the 
statements on measurement error in the dependent variable and the 
necessity of accounting for the correlation between initial level and change 
(sometimes called “regression to the mean”) do not usually apply to 
equations derived from first differences. We demonstrate why this is the 
case and argue that many published applications of two-wave panel models 
control for lagged values of endogenous variables without adequate the- 
oretical justification. This discussion suggests that there are serious prob- 
lems of interpretation with the commonly estimated cross-lagged and 
other two-wave panel models. 
The paper begins with a discussion of a general model derived by first 
differences. The effects of measurement error are considered in the context 
of this discussion. In the next section a model of first differences is 
compared to conventional two-wave panel models. Regression to the 
mean, state dependence, heterogeneity, and dynamic models of behavior 
are all examined as possible justification for the inclusion of initial level 
of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of a change equation. 
A final section considers an example from the literature on stressful life 
events that is well represented by the first-difference model in its dynamic 
aspects and an example that is poorly represented by such a model. 
THE GENERAL MODEL OF FIRST DIFFERENCES 
Most estimates from survey data are of cross-sectional models. A very 
simple form for such models is: 
yit = PO + PIXir + PZZir + &it (1) 
where Yit is the value of the dependent variable for the ith individual at 
time t, and Xi, and Z;, are values of the two independent variables for 
the ith individual at time t. In most survey applications, t corresponds 
to the time of the interview. Although the model as specified by Eq. (1) 
is static in the sense that all of the measures are taken at a single point 
in time, Schoenberg (1977) has shown that such models are generally 
consistent with dynamic processes in which the state at time “t” is a 
function of the initial conditions of the system. Such models are termed 
“nonergodic” and are contrasted with ergodic models in which the past 
can be forgotten in the sense that the current state does not depend upon 
the initial conditions. We assume initially that model (1) is correctly 
specified and later consider variations of this model. 
Suppose that a panel survey design gives us measures of Y, X, and 
Z for the same individual at a subsequent point in time, say t + 1, and 
further suppose that PI and p2 (the effects of X and Z on Y, respectively) 
do not change between t and t + 1. Can those panel data give us better 
estimates of the crucial parameters in Eq. (I)? 
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The answer to this question depends upon the measurement properties 
of the X and 2 variables and upon the nature of the error term in Eq. 
(1). Under certain circumstances, a simple difference equation such as 
Eq. (2) below, in which changes in Y are regressed on changes in the 
X and Z variables, give better estimates of PI and pz than would come 
from estimation of Eq. (1). 
AY = Ap, + j3,AX + p2AZ + AE (21 
where “A” represents simple change between t and 1 + 1 and the 
individual subscript “i” has been (now and hereafter) suppressed for 
notational convenience. Those circumstances include the following: 
1. Znstances where the Z variables are unmeasured and unchanging. 
Most social science theories reserve a place for the effects of unchanging 
“taste,” background, or personality factors. Typically these factors are 
not measured. If they are correlated with observed X variables and with 
the Y variables, then estimation of Eq. (1) with cross-sectional data may 
well be biased by the omission of these Z variables. (This is demonstrated 
more formally below.) A change equation like (2) solves this omitted 
variable problem because changes in these unchanging Z variables are, 
by definition, zero and Eq. (2) reduces to a regression of AY on AX. 
The parameter p, in this change equation corresponds to the same parameter 
in level Eq. (l), but the estimation problems caused by the Z variable 
have been eliminated. Note, however, that this method of obtaining 
cleaner parameter estimates of observed X variables will only work in 
instances where the values of X change for a substantial portion of 
individuals over time.’ Less obvious but also crucial is the assumption 
that the error terms in the process that generates changes in X are 
independent of the error term in (2). 
2. Instances where observed X variables are measured with errors that 
persist over time. Measurement error in the X variable is likely to bias 
estimates of p, in (1) toward zero. To see this, suppose that the “true” 
value of X, is related to the observed value of X, by 
x = x, + u, (3) 
where $ is the observed amount of X at time t, X, is the true amount, 
and u, -N(O,u$. 
For the cross-sectional Eq. (l), it can be shown that as the sample 
size becomes very large, the OLS estimate of & will not, in general, 
collapse on the value PI. Instead, this probability limit (plim) will be 
plim @,) = PI + Pzbw 
1 + War(u,FMX,)l (4) 
’ Hausman and Taylor (1980) develop a method for estimating parameters of unchanging 
X variables in first-difference equations. 
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where bZx is the regression coefficient of X when Z is the dependent 
variable. 
There are two sources of inconsistency affecting the estimate of p, 
from cross-sectional Eq. (1), the first one due to measurement error and 
the other due to the correlation between the omitted Z variable and X. 
In general, the larger the measurement error (Var(u,)) and the greater 
the correlation between X and Z, the greater the inconsistency of the 
OLS estimate of p1 from Eq. (1). 
But now consider the change Eq. (2). If measurement error in the X 
variable is correlated over time according to 
4 = pu,-, +vvl, (5) 
and if the 2 variable is unchanging, then the probability limit of the OLS 
estimate of parameter pi from change Eq. (2) is 
plim(@,) = Pl 
I + [( 1 - p)*Var(u,) + Var(v,)l/Var(hX) 
(6) 
where Var(AX) = Var(X,) + Var(X,- i) - 2Cov(X,,X,- i). If there is no au- 
tocorrelation in the measurement error in the X variable (i.e., p = 0) 
and no biasing effect of unmeasured Z variables, then the cross-sectional 
form is generally preferred to the change form since the variance of AX 
will generally be smaller than the variance of X. On the other hand, a 
remarkable result from (6) is that perfect autocorrelation between the 
measurement errors of X at the two points in time (i.e., p = 1 and v, 
= 0) will cause no estimation problems for the method of first differences; 
the OLS-estimate of pi from (2) is consistent. Although perfect auto- 
correlation will be rare in survey data, substantial positive autocorrelation 
is likely to arise when respondents persistently over- or understate re- 
sponses or persistently misinterpret questions. 
3. Instances where the panel data give more reliable measurement of 
changes in X between t and t + 1 than in the level of X at time t. 
Suppose that Y is earned income and X is work experience. Cross- 
sectional surveys obtain measures of X retrospectively, a procedure filled 
with possible memory error. But a panel that provides annual measures 
of work hours over the period between t and t + 1 will provide relatively 
more reliable measurement of changes in X between t and t + 1. (Corcoran, 
Duncan, and Ponza, 1983). 
In sum, the case for the superiority of change Eq. (2) over level Eq. 
(1) is obvious from a comparison of (6) and (4). The advantages of first- 
difference equations over cross-sectional formulations are greatest when 
(1) powerful, unmeasured Z variables bias the cross-sectional estimates, 
(2) errors in the X variable over time are highly autocorrelated, and (3) 
M is measured more reliably than X. The advantages of first differences 
are weakened (and cross-sectional formulations may be preferred) when 
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these conditions are not true and when the X variables are highly correlated 
over time. 
Extensions of model (1) to include lagged values of the exogenous X 
variables result in the need to have more than two waves of data to 
estimate the first-difference form, but the basic advantages of differencing 
remain. Suppose that Y is thought to be a function of not only the current 
level of X but also its past value, i.e., 
y, = PO + PJ, + P*Xr-I + PJ, + Et 
A differenced form of Eq. (7) is 
(7) 
AY = A/3,, + &AX, + &AX-, + &AZ + AE (8) 
where AXt = X, - X,-, and AX,-, = X,-, - X,-,. Estimation of this 
model would require three waves of data, since three observations on 
X (but only two observations on Y) are called for. All of the advantages 
of the first-differenced form derived above, especially the benefits of 
removing the biasing effects of unmeasured and unchanging Z variables, 
apply to this instance of a lagged X variable. 
Extensions of model (1) to include lagged values of Y on the right- 
hand side of the equation raise a number of theoretical and statistical 
issues. If Y, is caused by past levels of Y, then Eq. (1) is clearly m&specified 
and so is change Eq. (2). Differencing obviously does not solve fundamental 
problems of model misspecification. Although many change models that 
have appeared in the sociological literature do have lagged values of the 
dependent variables on the right-hand side, their specification is not 
usually well grounded in theory. Nor is it the case that there are good 
statistical reasons for the conventional treatments of lagged endogeneous 
variables. These issues are discussed in the context of two-wave panel 
models in the next section. 
FIRST-DIFFERENCE EQUATIONS AS COMPARED TO 
CONVENTIONAL TWO-WAVE, TWO-VARIABLE MODELS 
Algebraic Properties 
First difference models such as (2) bear a superficial resemblance to 
the general class of two-wave, two-variable (2W2V) models explained 
by Duncan (1969) and developed at greater length by other authors (e.g., 
Kessler and Greenberg, 1981). Although certain restrictions can be placed 
on the 2W2V models to make them identical to (2) these restrictions 
are typically not imposed. As a result there is a fundamental difference 
in how the two approaches treat the initial level (i.e., lagged values) of 
the dependent variable in the change model. These issues are explored 
in this section. A primary focus is on the possible justification for the 
conventional treatment of the initial level of the dependent variable on 
the right-hand side of the equation. We show that it is extraordinarily 
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difficult to justify its inclusion, and, as a result, parameter estimates from 
conventional 2W2V models have dubious validity. 
The general two-wave linear panel model can be expressed in equation 
form as follows: 
x* = a0 + YlXl + Y2 y, + Y3 y2 + v (9) 
Y2 = (Y1 + &Xl + PI Yf + @3X2 + 24. (10) 
The most general form allows for correlations between X1 and Y1, for 
possible two-way causation between the time 2 measures of X and Y, 
and for the possible correlation between the error terms in each of the 
two equations. The general model is underidentified and unless some 
restrictions are placed on this model (e.g., constraining some of the 
parameters to equal zero or to equal one another), there is no hope in 
estimating its parameters (Duncan, 1969). 
We begin by discussing the way model specification is typically ap- 
proached by sociologists and then discuss how the two-wave, two-variable 
model relates to a “first difference” approach to using two waves of 
panel data. 
1. Conventional sociological treatment. In the jargon of sociologists’ 
use of two-wave models, the parameters representing the effects of Y2 
on X2(y3) and X, on Y2(p3) are called “contemporary” effects and are 
thought somehow to occur instantaneously. The parameters y2 and p2 
are called “lagged” effects. A number of approaches can be used to 
place constraints on (9) and (10) so the equation system is identified. 
One common approach is to assume there are no contemporary effects- 
all effects are lagged by some specified amount. In this case y3 and p3 
are costrained to equal zero and the equation system is identified. 
These constraints produce what is usually referred to as a cross-lagged 
panel model. How can we substantively interpret the coefficients of this 
model? Taking Eq. (10) as an example and incorporating the constraints 
that there are no contemporaneous effects, no constant term, and arranging 
terms in a more intuitive way, one obtains 
Y* = p, Y1 + &X1 + 24. (11) 
The effect of Y, on Y2(p1) is typically called a “stability coefficient.” 
That is, controlling for X, and any other exogenous variables included 
in the equation, pi represents the extent to which the dependent variable 
remains stable over time. In social psychology, the dependent variable 
of interest is often a personal trait such as psychological distress (see 
example below) and /3, would be interpreted as the extent to which this 
characteristic is a stable trait of individuals. The problem with this inter- 
pretation is that “stability” is not a theoretical justification for including 
Y, as an explanatory variable predicting Y2 and the interpretation of p, 
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and pz as estimates of parameters of a causal model is problematic. All 
that has been said is that individuals high on distress at time 1 tend to 
be high at time 2 and individuals starting out low tend to remain low. 
One must probe further into the causes of the observed stability. 
One possible explanation for stability is that some unmeasured variables 
such as childhood experiences and genetic structure account for psy- 
chological distress at times 1 and 2. This is referred to in the econometric 
literature as “heterogeneity” and, as discussed below, including Y, on 
the right-hand side as a control for heterogeneity can lead to serious 
biases in the estimates of parameters p, and pz. 
When Y, is included as a predictor of Y, to control for the “stability” 
of Y, how can we interpret the effects of X1? Sociologists using this 
model would like to think that & is an unbiased estimate of the true 
causal effect of X1 on Y2, though it is often acknowledged that this 
assumption depends on whether the proper lag between time 1 and 2 
has been specified. Even if this time span represents the correct lag 
structure and if Y, is related to Y, because of “heterogeneity,” we show 
below that & will probably be a biased estimate of the causal effect of 
X, on Y2. 
Another way of deriving Eq. (11) is with the approach used by Bohmstedt 
(1969). He begins with the assumption that one is interested in the effect 
of X1 on the difference between Yi and Y2 as 
Y* - Y, = p2x1 + u. (12) 
Bohmstedt then notes that Y, is correlated to the change score AY and 
argues this represents “regression to the mean” and creates bias. He 
then argues that Y, should be included as a predictor variable on the 
right-hand side of (12) to control for this bias. Minor algebraic manipulation 
shows that the addition of Y, to the right-hand side of (12) produces an 
equation that is equivalent to (11). The problem with this reasoning is 
that regression to the mean does not necessarily create estimation problems 
(see below) and is not a proper justification for including Y, as a predictor 
on the right-hand side. 
2. First-difference approach. Suppose theory suggests that Xi has a 
lagged effect on Y2. Will the method of first differences help in estimating 
the parameters of a model consistent with that theory? We can represent 
the model as 
Y* = 6,X, + 6*Z + u2 (13) 
where 2 represents unmeasured background variables (e.g., childhood 
experiences and genetic structure). If this process also occurs with the 
same structure between time 0 and time 1, we can write: 
Yl = 8,X, + 62Z + UI. (14) 
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Since 2 are unmeasured variables, their effects cannot be directly modeled 
and if they are related to X, 6, will be a biased estimate. The cross- 
lagged panel design (11) uses Y, as a surrogate for these unmeasured 
variables which we argue below leads to new biases. By contrast, taking 
first differences leads to unbiased estimates as 
Y2 - Yl = 61(X, - x,, + u2 - u,. (15) 
There are three important points about (15). First, the unchanging Z 
variables have been differenced out so it is no longer problematic that 
they are unmeasured. Second, a third observation on X(X,) is needed. 
Third, Y, does not appear as a predictor variable on the right-hand side 
of (15). That is, regression to the mean is not presumed to be a concern 
and there is no attempt to estimate the “stability” of Y. Since the question 
of whether Y, belongs on the right-hand side of any of Eqs. (10) through 
(15) is so fundamental, this issue is examined below in detail. 
The Role of Initial Level as a Predictor Variable 
1. Regression to the mean in models of change. When specifying a 
model with a differenced dependent variable, many researchers express 
concern about potential bias from regression to the mean. Bohmstedt 
(1969, 1975) argues that the negative correlation between initial level and 
change should be controlled by adding the initial level of the dependent 
variable as an explanatory variable. In this section we show that this is 
not only unnecessary, it is likely to introduce bias rather than eliminate 
it. 
The phenomenon of regression to the mean, first documented by scientists 
studying the intergenerational progressions of vegetable sizes and of 
human heights, is the process by which a data series averages out to a 
mean level or growth rate. When compared to his family’s progression 
in height, an offspring who is unusually tall will generally have children 
whose height represent smaller deviations from the trend. If change in 
height is charted, the tall offspring will be associated with a larger than 
average change while his children will be associated with smaller than 
average or even negative change. 
The presence of random shocks in a model, whether they arise from 
measurement error or from parts of the process which through lack of 
knowledge cannot be modeled, implies that looking at just one observation 
per unit of analysis can be misleading. In our example on heights, the 
change in height between the unusually tall father and the grandfather 
yields a misleading indicator of the family’s average change in height. 
This problem is not unique to differenced observations; the presence of 
random shocks is as much of a problem when studying the level of a 
variable, e.g., if we just observe the fathers’ height our inference about 
the family’s average height will be inaccurate. 
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Consider for a moment the process summarized in (I), in which the 
dependent variable Y is explained or described by X. Dropping the 2 
variables yields the following:’ 
K = Pcl + P1-F + Et. (16) 
Maintaining the assumption of unchanging parameters between t and t 
+ 1 gives the following first difference form: 
or 
Y 1+1- K = PlW,,l -x0 + Et+1 -Et 
AY = j3,AX + AE. (17) 
The differenced equation looks like the model in Eq. (16) with redefined 
variables. What causes some concern is that the error term in (17) is 
correlated with the initial level of Y, i.e., E(As Y,) # 0. The ready availability 
of Y, and its integral place in the model seems to lead to the conclusion 
that Y, should be used to control for the disturbance term, AE. As a 
result, the initial level of the dependent variable is often included as an 
explanatory variable in the change equation. However, correlation with 
the disturbance term is clearly not an acceptable justification for including 
a variable in the model, despite the fact that for a given individual that 
information improves predictions. We could always find variables that 
are correlated with the error term, even if it is only the time of day that 
the information was coded, but we would never search for such variables 
let alone argue that they belong in the model. 
At the core of this controversy is explanation versus prediction. With 
most data any particular variable is well predicted by past values of 
itself and yet is rarely caused by its past values so we do not advocate 
adding lagged values unless there is a causal link. Despite the widespread 
use of initial level in models of change, few examples come to mind of 
processes where change is caused by current level. In this respect, including 
initial level on the right-hand side of a differenced mode1 is no more or 
less valid than including lagged dependent variables as predictors in the 
undifferenced model. For example, one’s socioeconomic origin will improve 
prediction of intergenerational mobility; however, we are generally less 
interested in predicting an individual’s mobility pattern than in under- 
standing the process by which mobility is enhanced or constrained. 
The argument to leave out initial level, unless it has a direct effect on 
change, may seem like advice to throw out perfectly good information. 
After all, although a father who exceeds his father’s height by quite a 
bit does not cause his children to have less change, they are likely to 
’ The set of variables X, that describe Y at time r could include lagged observations of 
X. 
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exceed him by less than he exceeded his father. Similarly, someone who 
earns an unusually large raise one year is likely to experience somewhat 
smaller earnings increases in subsequent years. This brings up a second 
important point. Typically, we are not considering observations on only 
a single case. Information on initial level is not needed to control for 
random shocks, even for prediction, as can be seen by the following 
example. 
Consider the relationship between earnings and psychological distress 
(PD) shown in Figs. 1 and 2. Suppose the relationship between the initial 
level of earnings and PD, depicted in Fig. 1, is causal with PD related 
to earnings as 
PD, = (Y + p Earn, + E,. (18) 
There will be individuals with positive residuals above the regression 
line and those with negative residuals below it. 
Consider individuals with a given level of earnings and positive residuals, 
e.g., those labeled &j in Fig. 1. On average, the residuals for these 
individuals at time t + 1 will be less positive and their residuals in the 
change equation will be negative. Individuals with negative residuals in 
the first period will most likely have positive residuals in the change 
equation (Q in Figs. 1 and 2). However, as long as these two sets of 
individuals are distributed independently of changes in earnings, they will 
not affect the estimate of p in the change equation. 
In general, if the sample has been drawn randomly from the population 
on which the model is based, the model is properly specified and the 
distribution of the disturbance term is symmetric, then controlling in the 
change equation for the presence of positive or negative disturbances in 
the initial period is unnecessary because the effects of the disturbance 
should average out over the population. 
Two possible counterarguments are that we do not have this faith in 
our model or that we use unweighted data in which individuals with 
either positive or negative disturbances in the initial period are oversampled, 
presumably by oversampling people with high or low initial PD. In these 
cases it might seem useful to include the initial level of PD in the change 
equation as a proxy for the disturbance term in the initial period.3 To 
see that there are more appropriate proxies, consider the implications 
of including E, as an explanatory variable in the change equation. 
3 Individuals with positive disturbances at time t have, as a group, above-average levels 
of Y at time r; those with negative disturbances have lower average levels of Y. Conversely 
higher initial levels of Y imply a somewhat higher probability of positive residuals and 
therefore a somewhat higher probability of a small change. 
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FIG. 1. Cross-sectional relationship between earnings and psychological distress. 
The disturbance from Eq. (16) can be expressed as 
&I= Yt-Po-PIx. (19) 
Including E, in the change equation to control for regression to the mean 
does imply that Y, enters as an explanatory variable in the change equation, 
but it also implies that X, enters as well. The change equation with E, 
added as an explanatory variable is 
AY = &AX + ~$8, + AE 
or 
AY = &AX + 4Y, - c#+,, - &3,X, + As (20) 
To estimate this equation, an instrumental variable must be used for Y, 
because it is generally correlated with the disturbance term (AC). Including 
only Y, as a proxy for the initial disturbance term (Ed) is inappropriate. 
While it is true that Y, is correlated with a,, controlling for E, implies 
far more about the equation to be estimated than the mere inclusion of 
FIG. 2. Longitudinal relationship between changes in earnings and changes in psychological 
distress. 
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Y, in the change equation.4 Thus, the conventional form of 2W2V models. 
with the initial value of the dependent variable on the right-hand side, 
cannot be justified by arguments about “regression to the mean.” 
2. Heterogeneity and state dependence. Arguments for the inclusion 
of initial level in a change equation sometimes center on the correlation 
of observations over time. Two distinct theories of why observations on 
a given individual are highly correlated over time are discussed in this 
section. The first, heterogeneity, proposes that unmeasured, individual- 
specific factors that lead to certain behaviors or attitudes at one point 
in time persist and influence future behaviors or attitudes. We have 
already seen that the effects of unchanging, unmeasured characteristics 
on the level of psychological distress are differenced out in a change 
equation. Thus, this kind of heterogeneity is handled well in a differenced 
equation in which the initial value of the dependent variable does not 
appear on the right-hand side. 
Unmeasured differences between individuals may affect not only initial 
level but also change. For example, particularly resourceful people may 
be especially healthy psychologically and also continue to develop psy- 
chologically at a faster rate than others less able to cope with life’s 
challenges.5 In this case, direct effects of unmeasured characteristics on 
change will not be eliminated in first-difference equations. Some researchers 
argue that the initial level of the dependent variable should be included 
in the change equation to account for these individual differences. 
Even if individual-specific variables are not observed, or for other 
reasons cannot be included in the change equation, it is still inappropriate 
to include the initial level of PD on the right-hand side of a change 
equation. The initial level of PD is an inappropriate proxy for heterogeneity, 
even though it may be highly correlated with the excluded variables, 
because it is correlated with the disturbance term. Its inclusion in the 
equation will result in inconsistent estimates. A more appropriate procedure 
for controlling for heterogeneity in this case is to apply the method of 
instrumental variables and use an instrument for PD on the right-hand 
side of the change equation. 
The second explanation of the correlation of individual observations 
over time is that of state dependence. Proponents of this view postulate 
that something about the initial level of the dependent variable has direct, 
causal bearing on subsequent change. For example, individuals with high 
4 Recall from the discussion of (1) and of (2) that any unobserved Z-type variables that 
are part of the level equation drop out of the difference equation. In (20), where the initial 
residual is added to the change equation, these variables no longer drop out and, if 
correlated to other included variables, the equation is not estimable. 
’ Note that this would lead to increased variance in psychological well being over time 
with the healthy and distressed growing increasingly far apart. Panel data in our experience 
do not support this view. 
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prior levels of PD may not be motivated to engage in training programs 
that might increase their earnings and reduce distress over personal 
failings. One may wish to build this assumption into a change model, in 
which case initial level of PD enters the change equation directly, as 
part of the theoretical model. This situation is often called state dependence 
because there is something about the initial state that causes future states 
and therefore change. 
Even though state dependence provides a justification for including 
initial level as an explanatory variable in a model describing change, the 
likely correlation between initial level and the disturbance term means 
the model as stated will be estimated with bias. To obtain consistent 
estimates of the parameters, an instrumental variable must be used in 
place of PD. The proxy variable should be one that is correlated with 
PD in the initial period but is not correlated with the disturbance term 
in either period. One possible proxy would be a still earlier value of PD; 
however, if serial correlation is present in the disturbance term of the 
level equation, prior values of PD will not be appropriate instruments. 
3. Dynamic models. The most sophisticated dynamic models are cbn- 
sidered to be those that use differential equations to specify continuous 
change. These models are in principle better able to capture the intricacies 
of the theoretical process than simple difference models when the process 
is continuous over time. If one’s psychological well being adapts gradually 
to new circumstances and measurements on psychological characteristics 
are frequent enough to capture this process, then a specification relating 
adjustment in psychological well being to a function of time and other 
explanatory variables may be useful. 
In the context of discussing the role of initial level as a predictor 
variable, it is important to point out that initial level does not automatically 
enter the specification when differential equations are used. Coleman 
(1968) makes this point clear by prefacing the discussion on differential 
equation models by the comment “we might assume that the rate of 
increase of the number of actions of a given kind in a group would be 
proportional to the number of actions already taken.” However, Coleman 
gives other examples where change is constant over time and does not 
depend on the level of the dependent variable. 
Researchers often seem to assume that since differential equations 
used in the physical sciences are frequently written as functions that 
relate change to initial level, this type of specification is necessary, or 
at least usually appropriate. This is not the case. The appropriateness 
of a differential equation for either physical or social sciences depends 
on its intended use-explanation or prediction. In describing the rate at 
which water flows out of a tank, one could model the change in water 
level between two points in time as a function of the amount of pressure 
and the size of the opening. However, since pressure is exactly related 
94 LIKER.AUGUSTYNLAK.ANDDUNCAN 
to the water level for a given container. one could posit a predictive 
equation in which the change in water level is a function of the initial 
water level. Water level does not help explain the process, but since it 
is perfectly related to the causal factor (water pressure), it predicts very 
well. 
In relationships outside the physical sciences there are several reasons 
why following this model may be problematic. First, in contrast to the wa- 
ter example, initial level is typically not perfectly related to the causal proces- 
ses in social science examples, so it is not a perfect predictor of change. 
Second, social science phenomena usually depend on interrelations between 
many factors, so explanation of the process is needed in order to make 
accurate predictions as factors change; we do not have controlled processes. 
Third, because our relationships are generally not fully explained, but 
rather include a stochastic element, statistical problems ensue when initial 
level is included in the model. 
This is not to say that initial level of the dependent variable never 
belongs in dynamic models, only that it does not enter automatically 
when a dynamic model is specified. There are dynamic models that do 
include initial level as a predictor because it is part of the causal process. 
Possible theoretical formulations that would justify the inclusion of the 
initial level of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the change 
equation are partial adjustment models and certain distributed lag models. 
See Kessler and Greenberg (1981) or Kmenta (1971) for a discussion of 
these models. 
APPLICATIONS TO STRESSFUL LIFE EVENT MODELS 
The method of first differences has been presented as an approach to 
reducing certain sources of bias in cross-sectional equations. This procedure 
will not eliminate specification errors arising from misrepresentation of 
dynamic processes. 
Under what conditions do first-difference equations accurately represent 
dynamic processes and under what conditions are they misrepresented? 
This section contrasts two theories of the relationship between socio- 
economic factors and psychological distress to illustrate the conditions 
under which first differences yield valid and invalid specifications. 
Reactive Theories 
The study of socioeconomic status in relation to psychological distress 
has a longstanding tradition among sociologists. The argument is that 
environmental conditions associated with class position influence psy- 
chological states. For example, poor housing, lack of money, blocked 
opportunities, and the like cause lower SES individuals to feel alienated, 
depressed, and develop other symptoms that we will generally classify 
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as symptoms of psychological distress (PD). This can be modeled in a 
cross-sectional formulation as 
PD, = /3,, + j3, SES, + &Z, + E,. (21) 
This formulation will generally yield a significant effect of SES (p,) if 
the sample size is large (although the magnitude of the effect is generally 
quite modest). Such cross-sectional estimates have been criticized by 
those who argue other variables, typically unmeasured (ZI), such as 
nutritional deprivation in infancy, inadequate parental role models, and 
even congenital disorders lead to both low SES and PD. Another argument 
is that the symptoms of distress, PD, actually cause people to be selected 
into relatively low SES categories-the social drift argument (Kessler 
and Cleary, 1980). 
An immediate problem with the formulation in Eq. (21) is that the 
argument does not directly refer to SES per se, but to a set of environmental 
conditions that are associated with SES. Hence, SES is really a surrogate 
measure that is likely to contain considerable measurement error. Setting 
aside this measurement issue, how would first differences help us to 
model this process? The first difference equation would appear as 
APD = A&, + &ASES + ,&AZ + As. (22) 
If the Z characteristics are unchanging, as they are in the examples 
above, AZ will equal zero and drop out of the equation. If there are 
consistent measurement biases in PD, as might be the case if self-reported 
symptoms are used, then these will be eliminated in the differenced 
equation. Moreover, the social causation argument falls into the class 
of “reactive” formulations which Augustyniak, Duncan, and Liker (1985) 
demonstrate is well represented by a simple differencing process. 
The social causation argument is that psychological states respond to 
environmental conditions much as mercury in a thermometer responds 
to a given temperature level. A unit change in temperature will result in 
a unit change in the density of the mercury which we will see as a change 
in level on the thermometer. A pure environmental argument would imply 
that a unit change in SES will lead to a unit change in PD, which is 
directly reflected in the differenced Eq. (22). One might argue that PD 
will be affected with some time lag in which case this can be easily built 
into the equation as discussed above. We call this a “reactive” model 
since a person is psychologically reacting to some environmental state. 
Estimation of this equation is still problematic for three reasons: (1) 
limited variance in ASES measure if measures at time I and 2 are both 
taken in adulthood when little change occurs; (2) measurement error in 
ASES; and (3) the influence of PD on SES is not taken into account. 
The first two problems can be resolved by measuring the actual conditions 
for which SES is a surrogate. While occupational prestige and formal 
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education (traditional SES components) do not change much in adulthood, 
environmental conditions such as income, housing, welfare receipt, and 
the like change a great deal (Duncan et al., 1984) and may be more 
accurate indicators of the conditions that influence psychological health. 
The issue of social causation versus social selection cannot be easily 
resolved as discussed above. One might make an argument about the 
time lags involved. For example, psychological states may respond to a 
new environmental condition rapidly while the reverse process takes 
more time. For example, even though one comes out of a bout of depression 
it will take time to undo the damage done while depressed, e.g., finding 
a job or a better job may require an investment in training. Hence, if 
one were to observe a correlation between changes in job status and 
changes in psychological states within a short time span it might be 
inferred that this reflects the effects of job status on psychological status, 
not the reverse. 
The problem of reciprocal causation cannot be resolved by simply 
controlling for the initial level of PD as Wheaton (1978) suggests. In a 
widely cited paper, Wheaton (1978) develops a conventional 2W2V model, 
and it is instructive to compare that model to Eq. (22) above. The equation 
for “current” psychological health from Wheaton’s Fig. 1 can be written 
as 
where PD and SES are as defined above and FASES is father’s SES. 
Wheaton uses confirmatory factor analysis with multiple indicators of 
psychological distress and adjusts for correlated specific variance in each 
multiple indicator over time, but this does not change the structural model 
above. 
Equation (23) is algebraically equivalent to 
PD, - PD3 = ,& + P;PD, + &SE!& - SES,) 
+ ,&SE& + ,G;FASES f E (24) 
where p; =p, - 1, & =&, pi =p2 +&, and& =p4. For simplicity, we 
have used the subscripts 1, 2, 3, and 4 to refer to the years of measurement 
1960, 1965, 1967, and 1971. 
If we believed the level of SES affected PD with a lag of several years, 
a differenced equation would then look like Eq. (24) with the constraint 
that py = p; = pi = 0. Before relaxing these constraints, we must ask the 
question: Why should the initial level of psychological distress, a prior 
level of SES, and father’s SES cause psychological stress from 1967 to 
1971 to change in a particular way? If father’s status had an effect on 
the subject’s health apart from the subject’s status, and this effect did 
not change over time, father’s status would cancel out in a change equation 
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since father’s status represents an unchanging background variable. The 
discussion of the possible justifications for including initial level of the 
dependent change score as a right-hand side variable applies here. 
We do not mean to assert that Wheaton (1978) was using first differences 
to derive Eq. (23). However, it is not clear from his paper what the 
justification is for including three SES measures and 1967 PD as causal 
factors in 1971 PD. One might argue that this is some form of a dynamic 
model that makes different assumptions from the “reactive” model, but 
it is not clear what those assumptions might be. 
Adaptive Theories 
The “reactive” model can be adequately modeled by simple first dif- 
ferences. However, there are other assumptions about the dynamic process 
relating environmental conditions to psychological states that cannot be 
handled in this way. 
The theoretical framework of most recent studies of stressful life events 
assumes that people become distressed because of the disorientation 
created by a large degree of change. The essence of the argument is that 
people grow accustomed to the way things are and react adversely when 
their steady life flow is seriously disrupted. At the extreme, any change, 
positive or negative, could be stressful (Holmes and Rahe, 1967), since 
some degree of readjustment is required. Modifications of this theory, 
however, suggest that only particular types of change cause psychological 
distress (Mueller, Edwards, and Yarvis, 1977) and add the assumption 
that people recover their prior psychological state with time (Surtes and 
Ingham, 1980). That is, after some period of time people adjust to their 
new situation, which eventually becomes their new accustomed way of 
life. We refer to this as an “adaptive” model. 
The contrast between the “reactive” and “adaptive” theories is ii- 
lustrated in Fig. 3. Suppose that personal earnings are the sole determinant 
of psychological distress (PD). Figure 3 shows the time path of psychological 
distress for 1969 to 1974 under the assumption that earnings in 1969 are 
$12,000, that earnings increase to $15,000 in 1970, 1971, and 1972, and 
then fall to $10,000 in 1973 and 1974. In the reactive model, increases 
in earnings change PD levels by a given number of units, but PD does 
not change again until earnings change, since only the income level affects 
PD. Note that we are making assumptions about the timing of influences- 
PD responds to new levels of earnings within a l-year period, and also 
about the duration of influences-there is no residual influence of having 
been at a specific income level. A person who earned $12,000 last year 
and $10,000 this year will have the same level of efficacy this year as a 
person who earned $5,000 last year and earns $10,000 this year. 
In the “adaptive” model PD is a short-term response, but then after 
some time people adapt and return to some steady state level of PD. A 
98 LIKER. AUGUSTYNIAK, AND DUNCAN 
\ /)LAdoptive Model 
\d 
g 1111111 .J I969 I 970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
YEAR 
Panel wave I I[ III 
Assumed level 
of earnings 
(in thousands) 12 15 15 15 IO IO 
FIG. 3. Changes in psychological distress in the reactive and adaptive models. 
process in which adaptations take between 1 and 2 years to complete is 
depicted by the dotted line in Fig. 3. There is some steady-state “adaptation 
level” of efficacy to which people return after a temporary disruption 
caused by a change in earnings. Until aspirations have been properly 
adjusted to this new earnings level, there is a discrepancy between as- 
pirations and achievements that causes efficacy level to be above or 
below this adaptation level. Note that the timing of measurement becomes 
particularly important if this model applies. If one were to have measures 
at waves I, II, and III in Fig. 3, it would appear that the changes in 
earnings between these waves had no effect at all on efficacy. It is only 
when measures are taken before a change occurs and then again before 
the affected individual has had time to adapt that the maximum impact 
can be assessed. More than two observations are needed to plot the full 
process of adaptation. 
We can represent the adaptive process more formally as 
PD, = /?,, + /I, (SES, - SES,- ,) + &Z, + E,. (25) 
If we were to observe the psychological distress of a sample at a later 
point in time (t + 1) we would observe 
I’D,+ 1 = PO + P,WS,., - SES,) + AZ,+, + &,+I. (26) 
Taking first differences would result in 
PQ+, -PD, = A/$, f /3, (SE&+, - 2SES, + SES,- ,) + AE. (27) 
An intuitive explanation for these results is as follows: If psychological 
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distress is the result of a change in life conditions (i.e., the first derivative 
of change in a continuous process), then a change in the level of distress 
is the result of a change in the rate of change in life conditions (i.e., the 
second derivative). Equation (27) results from an additional algebraic 
step which emphasizes the fact that we have been taken beyond the 
realm of two waves of panel data, and a third wave of data is needed 
(or change must be measured retrospectively in at least one wave). 
Most articles using panel data to assess the effects of changes in 
circumstances on psychological health differ from all three equations 
(25-27). Generally, they are our Eq. (25) with the addition of PD,-, on 
the right side (Myers et al., 1974; Pearlin, Mat-ton, Lieberman, Menagham, 
and Mullan, 1981; Thoits, 1982; Williams, Ware, and Donald, 1983). 
Again we suggest that the implications of including the initial level as a 
right-hand side variable have not been carefully considered in these cases. 
When we begin to consider adjustment processes such as the life event 
formulations it becomes increasingly implausible that discrete equations 
like (25-27) are adequate representations. To observe psychological distress 
that results from a change in environmental conditions (or persistent 
environmental conditions for that matter), one would have to measure 
psychological states before the individual had time to recover. Moreover, 
if recovery is a gradual process then the level of distress we observe 
will depend on the point in the recovery process that we observe the 
process. An appropriate differential equation model is necessary to rep- 
resent the process as it unfolds over time. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper focuses on the method of first differences as a way of 
developing models of change. A great deal of professional effort has gone 
into specifying cross-sectional equations and differencing them at two 
time points can improve estimates in certain instances. These include 
(1) instances where certain explanatory variables are unmeasured and 
unchanging; (2) instances where observed X variables are measured with 
errors that persist over time; and (3) instances where panel data give 
more reliable measurement of changes in X between t and t + 1 than 
in the level of X at time t. 
Another problem that has been discussed in the literature is the greater 
measurement errors in change scores. We have shown that this is not 
necessarily a problem in a difTerenced equation if the variables are measured 
with errors that persist over time; indeed, the model with change scores 
may even reduce biases caused by measurement error. Moreover, a 
simple algebraic manipulation will convert conventional two-wave, two- 
variable models into models with change scores and demonstrate that 
they do not reduce any measurement biases contained in modeis based 
on change scores. 
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The conventional two-wave, two-variable model used extensively by 
sociologists seems to have become part of the “culture” of linear panel 
analysis. With proper constraints this model appears to provide a means 
to model complex causal processes involving two-way causation. Duncan 
(1969) emphasizes that these constraints on the underidentified two-wave, 
two-variable model are critical and can dramatically alter substantive 
conclusions. We have gone further in questioning the basic structure of 
the model. 
When we take a common cross-sectional model and difference it, we 
derive an equation that is substantially different from the two-wave, two- 
variable model. The main differences are that the differenced model does 
not include roles for the initial level of the dependent variable, nor for 
the initial level of the independent variable. We argue that including the 
initial level of the dependent variable is seldom justified on statistical 
grounds, although it may be justified on theoretical grounds. Even when 
theory calls for inclusion of this initial level, statistical problems are 
likely and an instrumental variable substitute should be constructed. A 
rationale for including the initial level of the independent variable is also 
necessary and we have not seen such a stated rationale in the substantive 
literature relating socioeconomic status and stressful life events to psy- 
chological distress discussed here. 
In many cases cross-sectional equations are simply inadequate rep- 
resentations of dynamic processes. Our “adaptive” model is one such 
case which calls for some form of continuous time model. In this case, 
taking first differences of incorrectly specified cross-sectional equations 
will result in a poorly specified difference equation. Differential equation 
models appear to be a fruitful direction for future research on dynamic 
processes. These models will be no less susceptible to misspecification 
than two-wave, two-variable models, and we recommend caution in 
adopting functional forms used in the physical sciences that may not 
apply to social processes. 
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